代码审计系列之Hessian开发框架
Hessian框架简介
Hessian是一个轻量级的remoting onhttp工具，使用简单的方法提供了RMI的功能。 相比WebService，Hessian更简单、快捷。采用的是二进制RPC协议，因为采用的是二进制协议，所以它很适合于发送二进制数据。
代码效果参考：http://www.ningluan.com/sitemap.xml
前言
很多人做安全服务经常会碰到hessian开发的应用，特别是在app中应用最多，这次通过讲解hessian框架的包结构进一步分解渗透测试的难度，让二进制包的测试变的跟普通的请求包一样简单。
框架代码分析
根据官网给出来的默认配置如下web.xml
HessianSpringInvokeService
/*.hessian
跟进分析HessianSpringInvokeService：
protected void service(HttpServletRequest var1, HttpServletResponse var2) throws ServletException, IOException {
String var3 = var1.getRequestURI();
int var4 = var3.lastIndexOf("/");
if(var4 > 0) {
var3 = var3.substring(var4 + 1);
}
if(!var1.getMethod().equals("POST")) {
var2.setStatus(500, "Hessian Requires POST");
PrintWriter var16 = var2.getWriter();
var2.setContentType("text/html");
var16.println("<h1>Hessian Requires POST</h1>");
} else {
try {
ServletInputStream var7 = var1.getInputStream();
ServletOutputStream var8 = var2.getOutputStream();
var2.setContentType("application/x-hessian");
int var9 = var7.read();
int var10;
int var11;
Object var12;
Object var13;
if(var9 == 72) {
var10 = var7.read();
var11 = var7.read();
if(var10 != 2 || var11 != 0) {
throw new IOException("Version " + var10 + "." + var11 + " is not understood");
}
var12 = this.createHessian2Input(var7);
var13 = new Hessian2Output(var8);
((AbstractHessianInput)var12).readCall();
} else {
if(var9 != 99) {
throw new IOException("expected \'H\' (Hessian 2.0) or \'c\' (Hessian 1.0) in hessian input at " + var9);
}
var10 = var7.read();
var11 = var7.read();
var12 = new HessianInput(var7);
if(var10 >= 2) {
var13 = new Hessian2Output(var8);
} else {
var13 = new HessianOutput(var8);
}
}
SerializerFactory var14 = this.getSerializerFactory();
((AbstractHessianInput)var12).setSerializerFactory(var14);
((AbstractHessianOutput)var13).setSerializerFactory(var14);
this.getSkeletonByServiceId(var3).invoke((AbstractHessianInput)var12, (AbstractHessianOutput)var13);
} catch (Throwable var15) {
throw new ServletException(var15);
}
}
}
从上面的逻辑可分析出来两个主要走向
int var9 = var7.read(); 如果这个值得ascii码为72，也就是H，紧接着又读取了两个字符，如果这两个字符的ascii不等于2或者0，那么直接就走进了反序列化逻辑
var12 = this.createHessian2Input(var7);
var13 = new Hessian2Output(var8);
这里存在rec漏洞，不是我们今天要讲解的，漏洞可以参考：https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec 里面对于hessian的反序列化
int var9 = var7.read(); 如果这个值得ascii码为99，也就是c，然后再连读两个字符，从这里看出来并没有实际意义，分析为占位符，此时的post数据可以假定为c11，初始化了hessian的上下文：
SerializerFactory var14 = this.getSerializerFactory();
((AbstractHessianInput)var12).setSerializerFactory(var14);
((AbstractHessianOutput)var13).setSerializerFactory(var14);
然后就是根据rmi服务端注册的，进行调用，这里要重点分析一下：
跟进getSkeletonByServiceId这个函数：
private HessianSkeleton getSkeletonByServiceId(String var1) {
HessianSkeleton var2 = (HessianSkeleton)this.skeletons.get(var1);
if(var2 != null) {
return var2;
} else {
Object var3 = ApplusContext.getBean(var1);
var2 = new HessianSkeleton(var3, var3.getClass());
this.skeletons.put(var1, var2);
return var2;
}
}
所有的映射都存在this.skeletons里面，假设我们要访问的请求url为：
http://127.0.0.1/admin.license/EncryptService.hessian
首先我们通过String var3 = var1.getRequestURI()获取到的uri为/admin.license/EncryptService.hessian
hessian和spring整合的最多，所以必定也会存在一个映射配置文件applicationContext-all.xml：
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
回头看看刚才那个函数，跟进：
public static Object getBean(String var0) {
Object var1 = threadLocal.get();
if(var1 != null && var1 instanceof Long) {
Long var2 = (Long)var1;
Bundle var3 = Activator.getInstance().getBundleContext().getBundle(var2.longValue());
ApplicationContext var4 = getApplicationContext(var3.getSymbolicName());
if(var4 == null) {
var4 = (ApplicationContext)applicationContexts.get(var1);
}
if(var4 != null) {
try {
return var4.getBean(var0);
} catch (Throwable var5) {
;
}
}
return getBeanFromRequiredBundles(var0, new ArrayList(), var3);
} else {
return null;
}
}
这里就是从配置文件获取绑定的bean，此时这个映射的hessian对应的实现接口类就有了com.ufgov.admin.license.svc.EncryptServiceImpl，当然了这个里面存在了所有的对外接口，不做分析，直接看数据包的结构，跟进invoke函数：
public void invoke(Object service, AbstractHessianInput in, AbstractHessianOutput out) throws Exception {
ServiceContext context = ServiceContext.getContext();
in.skipOptionalCall();
String header;
while((header = in.readHeader()) != null) {
Object methodName = in.readObject();
context.addHeader(header, methodName);
}
String var14 = in.readMethod();
int argLength = in.readMethodArgLength();
Method method = this.getMethod(var14 + "__" + argLength);
if(method == null) {
method = this.getMethod(var14);
}
if(method == null) {
out.writeFault("NoSuchMethodException", "The service has no method named: " + in.getMethod(), (Object)null);
out.close();
} else if("_hessian_getAttribute".equals(var14)) {
String var15 = in.readString();
in.completeCall();
String var16 = null;
if("java.api.class".equals(var15)) {
var16 = this.getAPIClassName();
} else if("java.home.class".equals(var15)) {
var16 = this.getHomeClassName();
} else if("java.object.class".equals(var15)) {
var16 = this.getObjectClassName();
}
out.writeReply(var16);
out.close();
} else {
Class[] args = method.getParameterTypes();
if(argLength != args.length && argLength >= 0) {
out.writeFault("NoSuchMethod", "method " + method + " argument length mismatch, received length=" + argLength, (Object)null);
out.close();
} else {
Object[] values = new Object[args.length];
for(int result = 0; result < args.length; ++result) {
values[result] = in.readObject(args[result]);
}
Object var17 = null;
try {
var17 = method.invoke(service, values);
} catch (Throwable var13) {
Throwable e = var13;
if(var13 instanceof InvocationTargetException) {
e = ((InvocationTargetException)var13).getTargetException();
}
log.log(Level.FINE, this + " " + e.toString(), e);
out.writeFault("ServiceException", e.getMessage(), e);
out.close();
return;
}
in.completeCall();
out.writeReply(var17);
out.close();
}
}
}
这里的readHeader先不关注其内容，直接跳跃读取method
public String readMethod() throws IOException {
int tag = this.read();
if(tag != 109) {
throw this.error("expected hessian method (\'m\') at " + this.codeName(tag));
} else {
int d1 = this.read();
int d2 = this.read();
this._isLastChunk = true;
this._chunkLength = d1 * 256 + d2;
this._sbuf.setLength(0);
int ch;
while((ch = this.parseChar()) >= 0) {
this._sbuf.append((char)ch);
}
this._method = this._sbuf.toString();
return this._method;
}
}
从这里可以看出来，获取接口里面函数的方法字符为ascii为109 也就是m，这时候的post为c12m，然后继续再读取两个字符，用他的ascii码了通过计算一个长度，并取得后面的字符串，我们假设方法为getmodelCodeInfo，那么m后面的两个字符算出来要是个16长度最后才能返回getmodelCodeInfo
如果d1为0x00字符，d2 为0x10,这样就是一个十六，那么此时的post为c12m%00%10getmodelCodeInfo
下来走到：
Method method = this.getMethod(var14 + "__" + argLength);
这里我看看初始化是怎么存储的：
protected AbstractSkeleton(Class apiClass) {
this._apiClass = apiClass;
Method[] methodList = apiClass.getMethods();
for(int i = 0; i < methodList.length; ++i) {
Method method = methodList[i];
if(this._methodMap.get(method.getName()) == null) {
this._methodMap.put(method.getName(), methodList[i]);
}
Class[] param = method.getParameterTypes();
String mangledName = method.getName() + "__" + param.length;
this._methodMap.put(mangledName, methodList[i]);
this._methodMap.put(mangleName(method, false), methodList[i]);
}
}
这里获取了所有的rmi的服务端接口所对应的方法，存储的是”方法名_参数的个数”，最后通过var17 = method.invoke(service, values);直接进行了反射调用，后面就是读取以后的参数字符串
public Object readObject() throws IOException {
int tag = this.read();
String type;
int type1;
switch(tag) {
case 66:
case 98:
this._isLastChunk = tag == 66;
this._chunkLength = (this.read() << 8) + this.read();
ByteArrayOutputStream url2 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
while((type1 = this.parseByte()) >= 0) {
url2.write(type1);
}
return url2.toByteArray();
case 68:
return new Double(this.parseDouble());
case 70:
return Boolean.valueOf(false);
case 73:
return new Integer(this.parseInt());
case 76:
return new Long(this.parseLong());
case 77:
type = this.readType();
return this._serializerFactory.readMap(this, type);
case 78:
return null;
case 82:
type1 = this.parseInt();
return this._refs.get(type1);
case 83:
case 115:
this._isLastChunk = tag == 83;
this._chunkLength = (this.read() << 8) + this.read();
this._sbuf.setLength(0);
while((type1 = this.parseChar()) >= 0) {
this._sbuf.append((char)type1);
}
return this._sbuf.toString();
case 84:
return Boolean.valueOf(true);
case 86:
type = this.readType();
int url1 = this.readLength();
return this._serializerFactory.readList(this, url1, type);
case 88:
case 120:
this._isLastChunk = tag == 88;
this._chunkLength = (this.read() << 8) + this.read();
return this.parseXML();
case 100:
return new Date(this.parseLong());
case 114:
type = this.readType();
String url = this.readString();
return this.resolveRemote(type, url);
default:
throw this.error("unknown code for readObject at " + this.codeName(tag));
}
}
这里这里我们选择asiic为83的而不选择115 因为两个逻辑等级，因为后面的parseChar有问题
private int parseChar() throws IOException {
while(this._chunkLength <= 0) {
if(this._isLastChunk) {
return -1;
}
int code = this.read();
switch(code) {
case 83:
case 88:
this._isLastChunk = true;
this._chunkLength = (this.read() << 8) + this.read();
break;
case 115:
case 120:
this._isLastChunk = false;
this._chunkLength = (this.read() << 8) + this.read();
break;
default:
throw this.expect("string", code);
}
}
--this._chunkLength;
return this.parseUTF8Char();
}
如果是83 那么久说明标志位结束了，整个语句结束的所有标志位：
public void readEnd() throws IOException {
int code = this.read();
if(code != 122) {
throw this.error("unknown code at " + this.codeName(code));
}
}
可以看出来结束字符为z，那么此时的postdata就基本已经成型了，c12m%00%10getmodelCodeInfoS%0081’ union select USER,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL from dual – sdz
这里的包结构就一目了然了
这里一定要记住参数长度是十六进制的表示，到此整个框架的流程，和数据包的构成方式就一目了然，对外网一个框架的请求演示如下：
渗透测试方法
对上面的请求包hex：
53表示S，00表示占位，38表示后面的参数值的长度这里换算为56个字符
总结
hessian结构的要严格限制序列化和反序列化操作，以官方最新版本为主
正常的构造请求包，修改参数值，相对应的要去修改对应的步长，不管数据结构有多复杂，不管是字符型，数字型，对象型，最终的解释都落在值上，只需要修改被测试的值前面的步长大于等于payload长度，多出来的字符可以用空格替代或者任意字符，比如注入可以用注释，然后多出来的就任意字符占位即可
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